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Abstract 
This pa.per develops a framework for a. general equilibrium a,na.lysis of asset markets 
when the number of assets is infinite. Such markets have been studied in financial 
economics in the context of asset pricing theories. A distinctive feature of a.n equilibrium 
model of asset markets is that investors' portfolio-choice sets are typically not bounded 
below. We prove that a.n equilibrium exists under a. condition tha.t markets a.re a.rbitra.ge­
free. The markets a.re arbitrage-free if there is a. price system under which no investor 
has a.n arbitrage opportunity. The concept of an arbitrage opportunity used in this pa.per 
differs from the standard concept on an arbitrage portfolio in financial markets which is a. 
portfolio that guarantees a non-negative payoff in e\·ery event, a. positive payoff in some 
event and has zero price. We provide an extensive discussion of concepts of an arbitrage 
opportunity. 
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1 Introduction
Modern asset pricing theories study pncmg relations ansmg in models of competitive 
asset markets. The classical Capita.! Asset Pricing l\foclel of Lintner (1965) and Sharpe 
(1964) is an example of such a theory which derives sha.rp predictions about asset prices 
from a simple equilibrium model of asset trading. The critical assumption of the CAPM is 
that investors are guided in their investment decisions only by the mean and the variance 
of a payoff of a portfolio. An alternative asset pricing theory is the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory of Ross (1976). The APT derives an (approximate) pricing relation in the limit 
as the number of traded assets increases indefinitely. The critical assumptions of the 
APT a.re the factor structure of asset payoffs and the absence of (approximate) arbitrage 
opportunities. The CA PM, and - more generally - a finite asset market model is well­
understood from the point of view of the genera.I equilibrium theory, and conditions 
guaranteeing the existence of a.n equilibrium are well-known (see Ha.rt (1974) , Hammond 
(1983) ,  Nielsen (1989, 1990) ,  Page (1987)) .  Tn contrast, the APT is in its standard 
derivation a partial equilibrium model with prices exogenously given (see Chamberlain 
and Rothschild (1983), and Chamberlain (198:3) for the ntost comprehensive study). A 
general equilibrium analysis of the APT requires a countably infinite number of assets, 
optimizing investors, and a.n endogenous determination of equilibrium prices. This pa.per 
develops a. framework for such a,n analysis. 
The prototypical equilibrium model of finite asset markets which includes the CAPM 
as a. specia.Lcase..is .. due .. to Hart .(1.9.74) .. ..In I-I.art's mo.clel..a.ssets a.re.described by their end­
of-period (random) payoffs. Investors trade assets at. the beginning of a. time period so
as to maximize e"'j)ected utility of a payoff of a. p ortfolio subject to a budget constraint.
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They may have diverse expectations about asset payoffs. The Hart's model has the 
same structure as the standard Arrow-Debrcu model with the only difference that agents 
(investors) choose portfolios instead of commodity bundles. This difference has, however, 
profound implications for the existence of an equilibrium problem. Since asset short­
sales are permitted, sets of feasible portfolios a.re, in genera.I, not bounded below. This 
is a consequence of the fa.ct tha.t typica.lly there are portfolios with negative holdings of 
some assets that have positive payoffs with (subjective) probability one. A n  a.rbitra.ry 
replication of such a portfolio is feasible . It is worth pointing out tha.t feasible portfolio 
set is not the entire portfolio space, if an investor's end-of-period wealth is restricted 
to be non-negative. A condition that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in a 
finite asset market economy is that the economy is arbitra.gecfree (see ·Werner (1987), and 
Nielsen (1989); for a characterization of arbitrage-free economies in terms of a. condition of 
overlapping expectations see Hammond (1983) ). An economy is arbitrage-free if there is 
a price system under which no investor ha.s a.n arbitrage portfolio. An arbitrage portfolio 
is a. portfolio that guara.ntees non-negative payoff in every event, p ositive payoff in some 
event of positive r)l:ol)abilit,y1 and lias zero or negative i)rice. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the existence of equilibrium results to asset 
markets with infinitely many assets. More specifically, we extend the principle of the 
existence of an equilibrium in arbitrage-free economies to infinite asset markets. Our 
results require, however, a modification of the notion of an arbitrage opportunity. It has
long been recognized in the literature on asset markets that the concept of the absence 
of a.n a.rbit.ra.ge opportunity a.s developed for finite markets is far too weak for infinite 
markets (see Kreps ( 1981)). We provide in Section '1 a detailed discussion of concepts of
arbitrage. The need for a. modified notion of an arbitrage opportunity in infinite markets 
can be loosely explained as follows: If there is an arbitrage portfolio (with non-negative 
payoff in every event, positive payoff in sorne event of positive probability, and zero or 
negative price), then an investor would keep increasing without a limit the amount of this 
portfolio she holds. This would result in an unbounded sequence of portfolios increasing 
her utility while being budget feasible. In finite markets whenever there is an unbounded 
sequence of budget feasible portfolios increasing the (expected) utility, then there must 
be an arbitrage p ortfolio (see Proposition l in Section 4.1 ). In this sense arbitrage
portfolios fully characterize unbounded sequences of port.folios tha.t increase a.n investor's 
utility while being budget feasible. This logic breaks clown in the infinite dimensional 
case. In Section 4 we provide an example of an investor and a price system such that there 
is no arbitrage portfolio but there is a way ol' increasing the investor's utility without a 
limit at (almost) no cost. Therefore, an arbitrage opportunity in infinite markets has to 
be defined explicitly as a sequence of portfolios rather than a single portfolio in order to 
characterize opportunities uf-im::rcasing an i1wcstOT's utility at zero cost. 
\Ale propose to call a.n arbitrage opportunity a sequence of portfolios which increase 
an investor's utility indefinitely but the market value of the portfolios converges to zero 
or is negative. This concept is similar to the notion of approximate arbitrage in the APT 
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converges to infinity, the variance of the payoffs converges to zero, and the value of the 
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p ortfolios converges to zero. It is, however, much weaker since it bears no relation to a 
risk-free payoff and is utility-dependent. A price system is arbitrage-free if no investor in 
the market has an arbitrage opportunity, and an economy is arbitrage-free if the set of 
arbitrage-free prices is nonempty. 
The model of this paper is an abstract equilibrium model which is an infinite dimen­
sional extension of the model studied in 'Werner ( 1987). It looks very much like the 
standa.rd equilibrium model with infinitely many commodities (see Aliprantis, Brown, 
and Burkinshaw (1989), and Mas-Colell and Zame (1991)) with the notable distinction 
that agents' choice sets are not assumed to be bounded below. This distinction makes 
our analysis a.pplicable to asset markets models. V\fe find it appropriate· to study the 
existence of equilibrium problem in such a genera.I setting in order to separate complica­
tions caused by the absence of the assumption of bounded below choice sets from specific 
features of asset trading models. 'vVe use in our abstract model the terminology of the 
genera.I equilibrium theory such as a "commodity" and a "consumption set". Neverthe­
less, a reader should most naturally have an asset market interpretation in mind, and 
thus think about a "commodity bundle'' as a portfolio of assets (i.e., a list of sharehold­
ings of all assets) or a portfolio and a bundle of goods for current consumption. Section
6 provides an example of a.n infinite asset. market model as a special case of the general 
model underlying the rest of the paper, a.ncl can be consulted for details of the suggested 
interpretation. 
The model is presented in Section 2. Section :3 contains our main existence of equilib­
rium result for an economy with consLtmption sets which need not be bounded below. In 
Section 4 we introduce the concept of a.n arbitrage opportunity and examine its relation­
ship with alternative concepts. In Section 5 we show that an equilibrium price system 
is arbitrage-free, and we give an exislence of eqnilibrinrn result for an arbitrage-free 
economy. 
Equilibrium models related to the model of this pa.per have been studied by Chichilni­
sky and Heal (1991 ) and Cheng (1991) without an explicit. reference to the condition of 
no arbitrage. 
2 The Model
We shall consider an exchange economy with a commodity space E.  The space E is 
assumed to be a locally convex, topologicaJ vector space with topology T. There are 
m consumers indexed by i = 1 ,  ... m. Ea.ch consumer i is described by a consumption
set Xi C E, and an initial endowment e; E X;. The preferences of consumer i are
represented by a utility function u; : )(; -t R. The basic assumptions a.bout consumers'
characteristics that will be maintained throughon t the paper are the following: 
(Al) Xi is closed, and convex.
(A2) Ui i s  T-continuous, and there is Vi E E such that u;(x + av;) > ui(x) for every
x EX;, and a> 0.
It  should be emphasized that we do not assume that the commodity space is  a Riesz 
space or that consumption sets are the positive cone. The latter is of special importance 
for models of asset markets, where a commodity is a sha.re of a.n asset. 
We shall refer to a tuple (X;, u;, ei)i=l, .. .,m as an (euhange) economy. If E = Re for
some e, an economy will be called finite dimensional. Otherwise, it is infinite dimensional 
- the case of interest. 
The space of continuous linear fnnctiona1s 011 E will be denoted by E'. E' constitutes 
the price space for our model with a generic element p E E' being a price system.
3 Equilibrium
Any m-tuple of consumption plans 2• = (;r1, . . . • ;r,, ) such that x; EX; will be called an
allocation. If Ej;;1 X; = e ,  where e = E;';;1 e; is the total endowment, then the allocation
is attainable. Let A denote the set of all attainable allocations, and let U = { u = 
(u1, . . .  , u1n ) E 3im: 1li(ei) :::; l/,i:::; Ut(:r1) , ·i = 1, ... , rn. for son1e x = (x1, . . .  , Xm ) EA} l)e
the set of individually rntiona1 attainable u hli ty levels (utility sel:, for short) .  
A competitive eq1lilibrimn i s  a.11 attainable allocation :r = (.T1, . . .  , 2:,,,) EA and a non­
zero price p E E' such that x; E B;(p) and u.;(.r;) 2: ll;(2•) for every.T E B;(p), where
B;(p) = {.T E X; : p:r :':'. pe;} is the budget set. A qilasiequilibrimn is an attainable
allocation x E fl, and a. non-zero price p E R' such that p:r 2: pe; for every .T E X; with
ui(.T) 2: u;(.10;) . 
The existence of equilibrium theorem requires three more assumptions in addition to 
assumptions Al and A2. The first assumption is standard. 
(A3) Ui is c1l1a.si-co11cave.
The second assumption is not um1sua1 for equi librium theory in infinite dimensional 
spaces (see Aliprantis, Brown and Bnrkinshaw (1989 ) ,  Ma.s-Colell and Zame ( 1991)). In 
Section 5 we discuss a relationship between this condition and a condition of the absence 
of arbitrage opportunities. 
(A4) The utility set U is compact.
Thirdly, we impose a condition that guarantees that preferred sets a.re price supported 
(i .e . ,  for everyx EX; , if u;(1:') 2: v;(.T). then Jl.1•1 2': JJJ' for sorne p EE'). Let P;(x) denote 
the preferred-to-2· set, i.e., P;(;l•) = {.r' E )(; : H;(:r') 2: 11;(2•)}, for :r EX;.
(A5) int P;(.T) # 0 for every :r E X;.
We are now in a position to state our main existence theorem. 
Theorem 1: If an economy satisfies assurnplions Al, A2, A.'\', A4, and A5  for every
i = 1 ,  . . . , in, then it has q1tasiequilibrium.
The proof can be found in Appendix. The basic argument is that of Negishi which 
was extended to infinite dimensiona.l economies by Bewley (1969), Magill (1981), and 
Mas-Colell (1986) .  
If a quasiequilibrium (x ,p) is such that ]XU; > minpX; for every i ,  then (x, p) is an
equilibrium. Conditions to assure the minimum wealth constraint are standard. An 
important example is the condition e ;  - Ev; E X;, for some s > 0. 
vVe emphasize that the assumptions of our theorem do not require utility functions to 
be monotonic, or the consumption sets to be bounded below. Condition A.5 implies that 
consumption set X; has non-empty interior ruling out the positive cone in many spaces as 
a possible consumption set. The positive cone is, however, not a typical choice set in asset 
market models. The only role of assumption A5 is lo assure the price supportability of 
preferred sets (both for an individual consumer and for the whole economy), and could 
be replaced by any other conditioll sufficient for that (e.g. ,  uniform properness when 
consumption sets are the positive cone of a Hiesz commodity space). In this sense our 
result generalizes Theorem 7.1 in ]\fas-Cole!! and Zame (1991 ) .  
4 Arbitrage
This section is devoted to a discussion of concepts of an arbitrage opportunity. The first 
concept, which we call a. free lunch, is an extension of tbe standard concept of an arbitrage 
portfolio in finite asset markets. We shall argue that i t  is inadequa.te for the purpose 
of an equilibrium analysis of infinite markets. \\·'e introduce a.n a.lternative concept and 
investigate its properties. 
To define a. free lunch we need a notion of a direction of recession of a set and of a 
function. Let C be a closed and convex Sl1bset. of E. The recession (asymptotic) cone of 
C is the set of a.II vectors x E E such that ;r + ,\:l' E C for every :r E C a.nd every .\ ::0: 0.
The recession cone of C, denoted by AC, is  closed and convex. vVe show in Appendix
tha.t AC= {x E E: x = Jim,\""'n for some sequences {:rn} CC and {.\n} C R+ with 
Jim.\"= O}. An element of AC is called a direction of recession of C. 
Let f be a. concave and contirrnous real-valued function defined on a convex and closed 
subset C C E. A direction of recession off is a vector x E AC' such that f(x + .\x) is a 
non-decreasing function of,\ for ,\ E H.+ and for every :i: E C'. Equivalently, a direction of 
recession off is every element of the recession COllf' of a level set {1" E C: f(x') ::0: f(x)} 
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(which does not depend on x E C for a concave function) .  If both i: and �i: are directions 
of recession off, then .i; is a direction in which f is constant. 
Consider consumer i with utility function u; on X;. Vl/e shall strengthen assumption 
A3 to: 
(A3') Ui 1s concave.
A direction of recession of u; which is not a direction in which u; is constant will be 
ca.lied a useful commodity bundle. Let p E E' be a price system. 
Definition 1: A free lunch for consumer i (with respect to p) 1s a useful commodity 
bundle x E E such that px <:'. 0. 
This concept of a free lunch was introclucccl in \Verner ( 1987) (under the name of 
arbitrage opportunity) .  In I.he context of financial asset rnarkets, where a commodity 
bundle is a portfolio of assets, ancl the utility of a portfolio is the expected utility of its 
payoff, a free lunch is a portfolio with a non-negative payoff with probability one, positive 
payoff with positive probability, and 7,ero or negative value (see Section 6) .  In this sense 
the concept of free lunch is a natural extension of the concept of arbitrage portfolio in 
asset markets .  
Kreps (1981) pointed out that many c·onsequences of the condition of the absence 
of free lunch do not extend to infinite dimensiona.l economies. In accordance with this 
observation, concepts of an arbitrage opportunity used in the literature on infinite asset 
markets a.re different.. For inst.a.nee, in the cont.ext of the APT (see Ross (1976)) it is a 
sequence of port.folios with the mean of the payoffs converging to infinity, the variance of 
the payoffs converging to zero, and the value of the portfolios converging to zero. 
In our context a.n arbitrage opportunity is defined a.s follows: Let ii; = SUJJxEX;u; (x) 
(ii; can be finite or +oo ) .
Definition 2: An a.rbitra.ge opportunity for consumer i (with respect to p) is a sequence
of commodity bundles {.i,,} C E' such that c; + .i',, E X;, limu;(e; + :1:,,) = ii;, and
limpx,, <:'. o. 
vVe shall call a pnce system arbi!r11gc-frce for co11surner i if there 1s no arbitrage 
opportunity for i .  
4.1 Free lunch versus arbitrage opportunity. 
In general neither the existence of a. free lunch implies the E"xistence of a.n arbitrage 
opportunity nor the converse. However, in a. finite dimensional economy we have: 
G 
Proposition 1: Suppose Al, A2, and AS' hold, and E = Re, If p E Re admits no free
lunch for consumer i ,  then it is arbitrage-free for i ,  
Proof We first consider the case when there is no direction in which u ;  is constant.
Suppose that there is an arbitrage opportunity Un} for consumer i at p, Clearly {xn} 
i s  unbounded, Let x be any cluster point of { 11:'.';;11 }, \Ve have ;'i; le 0, px � 0 and x is a
direction of recession of u;. Thus ,'i; i s  a free lunch which contradicts the assumption. 
The proof in the case when there a.re directions in which u; is constant proceeds by 
restricting the utility function and prices to the subspace orthogonal to directions m 
which u; i s  constant, and applying the argument above. Details are omitted. I 
Proposition 1 does genera.lize to some infinite dimensional commodity spaces such 
as ba (the space of bounded, finitely additive set functions on N), but in most infinite
dimensional spaces 0 may be a cluster point. of the sequence { 11!�11 } ,  hence invalidating
the proof of Proposition 1. In the following ex;-unple tbe commodity space is C00, there is  
no free lunch for a consumer, but there i s  an arbi trage opportunity. 
Example 1: Let E = £00 and E' = C1. Consider the util ity function u : Ct, -+ Rdefined
by u (x ) = L�=16n(xn)� where :r = (T1, J•2, . . .  ), and 0 < 6 < 1. Let e = 0 be the
initial endowment. Every commodity bundle :I: E (t,, .1' le 0, is useful ,  and therefore
every strictly positive price system admits no free l unch. Let us consider a price system 
p = (p1 , p2 , . . .  ) E 1?1 given by Pn = 8'1". \Ve claim that p is not arbitrage-free. Let
;?;k E et, be defined by .T�. = f,-.3n for ll = AC and zero otherwis.e, k = 1 ,  2, . . . . We have
u( e + ock) = f/6-�k = &-�k -+ +00. On the other liancl p:rk = Ok -+ 0. Thus { xk} i s  an
arbitrage opportunity with respecl to I'· 
The proof of Proposition 1 and Example 1 suggest a reason why the concept of free 
lunch is  in general not adequate for infinite markets. Tt i s  the fact tha.t in infinite markets 
(unlike in their finite counterpart) an unbounded sequence of consumptions that increases 
a utility may not have a corresponding useful commodity bundle. 
An arbitrage-free price system admits no free lunch (in a finite or infinite dimensiona.l 
economy) provided tha.t Jim u.; ( c; + n,j·) = u;, for every useful commodity bundle x. This
last condition i s  indispensable as i llustrated by the fol lowing example: 
Example 2: Let E = R.2, u(2:1, 2'2 ) = rnin{T1.:rz}, and e = (2, 0) .  The price system
p = (1 , 0) is arbitrage-free but i t  admits a free lunch being :i' = (0 ,  1 ). Note that x is
useful but Jim u(e·+ ,nx) = 2 < u = +00.
5 Arbitrage and Equilibrium
One of the main issues we address in this paper is a relationship between an equilibrium 
and the absence of a.rbi tr age opport uni lies. In a finite dimensiona.l economy every equil-
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brium price system does not admit a free lunch (provided that utility functions have no 
half lines in indifference sets ) .  Moreover, the existence of a price system which does not 
admit a free lunch is sufficient for the existence of a.n equilibrium (see Proposition 2 (ii), 
and Theorem 1 in \Verner (1987)) .  In this section we investigate analogous results for an 
infinite dimensional economy using the concept of arbitrage opportunity. 
\Ve call a price system viable for consumer i, if the demand of consumer i is well­
defined, i .e . ,  there is Xi E Bi(P) such that u;(a:;) ?' u;(x) for every x E B;(p).
Theorem 2: Suppo.se Al, A2, and A.5' hold. If p E E' is viable for consumer i, and 
pei > minpXi, then p is arbitrage-free for consnm er i .
Proof Suppose the contrary. Then there is  a sequence { a:n} such that lim ui( ei + xn) = 
iii, and limp(e; + Xn ) ::; pe,:. Let 5' E .l(; be such that pS: < pe;. For 0 ::; A ::; 1 ,
A(e; + xn) + (1 - A)x E )(; . Let M he such that u,: ( :r,: ) < J\1 < i .,:. Since ui is concave,
there exists 0 < Ao < 1 such that liminfu,:(.\0(e; + xn) + ( l  - Ao)i) ?'Al. For n large
enough, we have u;( Ao( e; + '"") + (1 - Ao Ji) > u; ( :i:,: ) and p(,\0(ei + xn) + (1 - ,\0 )x) < pei
which contradicts the optimality of :r; in thP budget set B,:(p). II 
An immediate corollary is  the following: 
Corollary 1: If p is an equilibrium pncc 87JS/em, and pe; > min p)(; Joi· every i 
1 ,  . . . , m, then p is arbitrage·-free.
We note that a price system may lw arbitrage-free but not viable. This is  illustrated 
by the following example: 
Example 3: (Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinslrnw (1989 ) ,  Example :3.3.7) Let the com­
modity space be the space of continuous functions 011 t lie interval [O, 1] with the sup 
norm, and let the price space be the space of measures on [O, l]. Thus E = C[O, 1 ] ,  and 
E' = ca [O, l] . Consider a consumer witl1 the ntility function 
1/2 ] 
u(a: ) = /Fi dt + �/Fi dt,
0 1/2 
where x EE+· Let the initial endowment e EE+ he given by e(l) = 1 for all t E [O, 1] . 
Let the price p E ca.[O, l] be the Lebesgue measure. \Ve claim that p is arbitrage-free for 
the consumer. Since 
1 1 l/2 
u(x)::; /Fi di::; (/ :r(i) r11) = (p:l'.)1/2
0 0 
for every x E E+, we see that l im p:rn 
Therefore p is  arbitrage-free. 
s 
+:JO whenever lim u ( e + 1:n ) 1l +oo. 
Applying the arguments of Aliprnntis, Brown, and Bnrkinshaw (1989, pg. 130, and
175) one can show that the supremum of utility in the budget set B(p) is JI, which can
only be attained at the function er* given by /(I) = � for t E [O, �], and x*(t) = % for
t E (�, l]. Clearly x• i s  not in the commodity space E. However, it can be approximated
by a sequence of consumption plans {xn} C B(p), so that lim u(xn) =JI. Therefore
the consumer's demand at pis not well-defined, i .e. , p is not viable. 
In the remainder of this section we investigate the sufficiency of the condition that 
there is a price system which is arbitrage-free for every consumer for the existence of an 
equilibrium. To facilitate the discussion we shall call an economy- arb.itrage�free if there 
exists a price system which is arbitrage-free for every consumer. 
We shall focus our attention on assumption A4 of compactness of the utility set. 
The utility set is  compact if and only if it is closed and bounded. In economies with 
consumption sets being the positive cone boundedness of the utility set is a consequence 
of (order) boundedness of the set of attainable allocations. In our case boundedness 
of the utility set is a. legitimate concern, if some utility fnnctions a.re unbounded from 
above. Unbounded from above utility functions are frequently used in finance (e.g., 
constant relative risk a.version utility functions). Theorem :3 shows that the utility set of 
an arbitrage-free economy is bounded regardless or wlwther nti l ity functions a.re bounded 
fron1 abo-ve or i1ot. 
Theorem 3: Suppose A 1, A2, and A.]' hold for euery 1 
arbitrage-free, then the utility set ·is bo'll.nded. 
1, . . . , m. If the economy is 
The proof of Theorem 3 consists of three steps. The first two steps are Propositions 
2 and 3 for which Al, A2, and A'.l' are assumed to bold for every i. 
Proposition 2: 1f p is arbitrage-free for consumer i, then per > b for some b and every
x E P;( e;) .
Proof: Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a. sequence { �=,,} C E such that e; + Xn E
P;( e; ) for every n, and limpel'n = -oo . Let u,, = -p:r,,. For ea.ch n, define the set
H'n = {x E P;(e;): px ':'. �} . \Ve ha.ve P;(e;) C U:;"=1Vi/n· Let {zn} be a sequence
such that Zn E H/n and Jim u;(e; + z,,) = u;. Consider a. sequence {y,,} defined by
Yn = An:Tn + (1 - A,,)z,,, where ,\n = I+ 1 ,.,,,- . \Ve have PYn = ,\,,zn:n + (1 - An)PZn ':'. v Cl71 
An(-un) + (1- An)�= 0. Moreover, u;(e.; + y,,) ::0: A,,u; ( e; + :rn) + (1- An)u;(e; + z,,). 
Since An --> .O,,weDbta.in Jim u.;( e; + lfn ) = u.;., and .fo,,} .is .. a;, .. ,.a:rbitra.ge.opportunity. This
is a contra.diction. I 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the nlilily .function u; is unboundul, i.e . ,  u; = +oo. If p
is arbitrage-free .for consmner i, !hen I irnpx,, = +::xc for e oery sequence of consumpti:on
plans {ern} C X; such that linm;(:1,,,) = +x"
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Proof: Let {xn} C Xi be a sequence such that limu;(xn) = +oo and limpxn < +oo. Let 
Xn = Xn - ei, and a =  limpxn. \Ve have a < oo. There is a sequence {1n} C ti?+ such
that limu;(ei + /nXn) = +oo and /n --> 0. Indeed, let /n = �· Then, by concavity
11, (x11) 
of 7-li, 
u.;(e; + 'fnXn) u;("fn(e; + :!:,,) + (1 - '/n)e;) 
> 'f,,U;(J:n) + (1 - /n)u;(e;)
1 
- + (1- 'rn)u;(e;). 
/'n 
Therefore limui( e; + /nXn) = +oo. Since lirn p( ·y,,.i:,,) = 0, 
tunity contradicting our assumption. 
hn:i:n} 1s an arbitrage oppor-
11 
We a.re now in a position to prove Theorem :.l. 
Proof: Suppose by contrary that U is unbounded. Then there exists a sequence { un} C U
such that Jim u;;, = +oo for some i0. Let :r;' E P;( e;) be such th at u; (xi ) :'.': ui and
:Ei�1 x/ = e for everJ' n., a 11cl i = 1, . . .  , 177.. \1\1e have li1T1 'll·io ( .rj�) = +oo a.11d tl 1erefore
(Proposition 3) Jim p:ri;, = +:::o. By Proposition 2, Jim inf p:cj' > -oo for every i. Thus,
we obtain a, contradiction to p�i'.;,1 J:i = pe < +:x:·. II 
If the assumptions of Theorem :3 are satisfied. the economy is  arbitrage-free, and the 
utility set is closed, then condition AA holds. Thus. we have the following existence of 
equilibrium result for an arbitrage-free economy, as an irnrnediate corollary to Theorems 
1 and 3: 
Corollary 2: rf an economy is arbitraqe--.frec, satisfies assumptions A 1, A2, AS', and 
AS for every i = 1, . . .  , m, and has closed ulililu sci, then it has q1wsiequilibrium.
Closedness of the utility set is a frequent assurnption in equilibrium theory with infinite 
dimensional commodity spaces. lt is independent of the other assumptions of Corollary 
2, in particular of the assumption that the economy is arbitrage-free. In the following 
example the economy satisfies conditions Al,  A2, A:3', and A:), and is arbitrage-free (and 
therefore has bounded utility set), but the utility set is not closed. iVIoreover, there is no 
(quasi) equilibrium. 
Example 4: As in Example 3, let E = C'[O. 1], and E' = ca[O, l]. There are two
consumers, i = 1, 2 ,  each with the consumption set being the positive cone E+, and the 
endowment e; E E+ given by e;(t) = 1 for all t E [O, l], i = 1, 2. Consumers' utility
functions are: 1/2 
/ c;-;; Ji ' .J V'l'\''' Uf, T 
0 
I 
" / 'c;-;; ,]/ U/ J v·l,\l-j (ti,: 
- -1 ') _J_,.:., 
1 /2 
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for x E E+, where a1 = �' and a2 = 2. The econorny satisfies conditions Al, A2, A3',
and A5. Let the price p E
-
ca[O, 1] be the Lebesgue measure. vVe have shown in Example
3 that p is arbitrage-free for consumer l. By the same argument, p is arbitrage-free for 
consumer 2. Therefore, the economy is arbitrage-free, and by Theorem :3, the utility set 
is bounded. However, the utility set is not closed (see Aliprnntis, Brown, and Burkinshaw 
(1989), pg.130). Furthermore, there is no equilibrium in this economy. 
We conclude this section with another example. The purpose of it is to underscore our 
claim that the concept of a free lunch is inadequate for equilibrium analysis of infinite 
markets. This example shows an economy in which there is a price system which admits 
no free lunch for every consumer, but there is no equilibrium. 
Exa1nple 5: We extend Example 1 by adding one more consumer. We have E = f.00 and 
E' = f.1• Consumer 1 has consumption set X1 = f;I;,,, initial endowment e1=(1,0, 0, ... ) , 
and utility function u1(:r) = I.;:;','.,,1 lin(,rn)�, where :e = (.1'1,x2, ... ), and 0 < Ii < 1.
Consumer 2 has consumption set X2 = f"".' initial endowment e2 = (1, 1, 1, . . .  ), and 
utility function u2(x) = I.:�1 li'1"J:,,. Let the price system p = (p1, p2 ,  •.• ) E !'.'1 be given
by Pn = o4n. Note that u2(:i:) = pJ:. Clearly p admits no free lunch for both consumer
1 (as argued in Example 1) ,  and consumer 2 .  vVe claim that there is no equilibrium. 
One can easily show that p is tile only viable price for consumer 2, and hence the only 
candida.te for an equilibrium price. How<'\'CL as shown in Example I, pis not arbitrage­
free for consumer 1 ,  a.ncl, by Theorem 2, not ,·iable for consumer 1. Therefore there is 
no equilibrium. One can also show that p is the only arbitrage-free price for consumer 
2. Since p is not arbitrage-free for consunwr I. t he economy is not arbitrage-free.
6 Example: Securities Market Model
In this section we present an example which illustrates that the results of the preceding 
sections are suitable for an application to financial markets. The example is along the lines 
of the securities market model of Hart (19/:}) but it includes infinitely many securities. 
We shall show that the assumptions of our existence resul t  (Corollary 2) are satisfied in 
such a framework. In particular, the condition A'i of the nonempty interior of preferred 
sets is satisfied. 
Let there he m investors and a countably infinite collection of securities indexed by 
n = 1 ,  2, . . . . A typical portfolio of securities is .r = (:r1, .r2, ..• ) with crn being the number
of shares of security 17. We sha]] require that I.:'�1 jcrnl <co, i .e . ,  that the total number 
of shares (short or long) is finite. Thtis the portfolio space is C,. Security price space is 
f.00 - the norm dual of C1 -- and sop= (p 1 , p2 • . . .  ) E l'.x. is a list of prices of all securities
with SllPn IPn I < oc .  
Security payoffs are described as follows: LeL (ll, :F, P) be  a probability space (state 
space). The payoff of security n is 1'n E £,x.(i'l,:F,P), i .e. ,  an (essentiaiiy )  bounded
random variable rn. To simplify notation we shall cknotc .C.x.(ll, :F, P) by .C00• We 
1l 
assume that there is  a. risk less security, say secnrity 1, with r1 ( w) = 1 for ea.ch w E !1. 
Furthermore, we assume that for all n, rn E C'  for some ( sup norm) bounded set C' C C"t,. 
Investors have homogeneous expectations and they all expect security payoffs to be a.s 
described above. 
Investors never plan to have negative end-of-period wealth.  The feasible portfolio set 
of investor i is r = {x E £1: L��o :rnrn 2: O}, where the ineqna.lity in the definition of r 
i s  with respect to the order of C0,,, i .e., it holds with P-proba.bility one. Initial portfolio
of investor i is xi E r. Let .i' = L�1 xi denote the outstanding portfolio of securities.
Each investor has a von Neuman-Morgenstern utilityfonction of.wealth u,_: R+--> R 
and evaluates a portfolio according to the expected utility of its payoff. We assume that 
u; is concave, continuous, increasing and unbounded .above. For example, Ui could be a 
constant relative risk aversion utility function. Let 11; : r--> R be the indirect utility of
a portfolio, i .e. ,  Vi(:e) = Eu;(L�o �•n rn) . wlwre the <:xpected va.lue is taken with respect
to the probability measure P.  
The securities market economy described above is an example of an abstract exchange 
economy of Section 2. Accordingly, an equilibrium consists of a. portfolio a.lloca.tion 
( x1, x2, . . .  , xm), a.nd a price system p E £00 such that I:;'�1 "'i = x and each portfolio xi
maximizes Vi(x) over x E r  subject to the conslraint. p:r � pi';. 
A free lunch for investor i (in the sense of Definition 1) is a portfolio x such that 
2:::;"=0 Xnrn 2: 0, P(I:':,:-:,,0 :rnTn > 0) > 0. and p:1: � 0. This is the stancla.rcl concept of
finance. An arbitrage opportunity for investor i is a sequencre of portfolios {xk} C l1, 
such that I�(:r; + .rk)-+ +oc. and lirn7uk � 0. 
I..1et us co11sider a price syste11 1  JJ E tx. glvC"n by Pn = _Ern, n. = 0, 1, . . . . By .Jense11's
inequality 1/;(x) = Eu,(l::xnrn) � 1li(L.T.,,Ern) = u;(p:i:) .  Consequently, if1f;(xi+xk)--> 
+oc for a sequence {:ck} c e,, then l'"'k -+ +:xc, hence )J is arbitrage-free for every 
investor. Tl1e securities 11 1arket econor1\y is arbitra.ge-free. 
'vVe claim that condition A5 of the nonempty interior of preferred sets is satisfied. To 
this encl let us consider the set r of port.folios with noH-negative payoffs, and a portfolio 
v = (1, 0, . . .  ) consisting of the risldess security only. \\'e will show that v E intf, where
int denotes norm interior in £1 . Let /\ = sup.,, llrnll x·· By our assumptions 1 � ]{ < oo. 
Let z E £1 be such that llv - zlli < 1,:. It suffices to show that z E f. We have
1 - 2::;';°=1 z,,rn(w)I =I L�1(vn - z.,,)r,,(w)I � K · llv - clli < 1 holds with ?-probability 
one. Therefore 2::;';°=1 z,,r,,(w) > 0, and :o E r. Since "' + l' C P;(x) for every x E X,,
P, ( x) has nonempty jnterior. 
The securities market economy satisfies conditions Al and A2 (with Vi = (1, 0, . . .  )) 
as well. Vie shall demonstrate thA closeclness of the utility set in a special case of the 
Equilibrium APT model of Connor (1984). In such a case asset payoffs can be expressed 
in for11 1  of a. factor n1odcl \Vitl1 fi.nit.cl:v rnany factors. Specifica.lly, let 'i\1 = Lf�1 f3n1f1+�n
holds for every 11 = 1,  2, . . .. where /7 E Lx. for j = 1, . . . , Na.re the factors, and i'>.n is
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the idiosyncratic risk term such that £( !':.,, lf1 . . . . , ./�v) = 0 for every n. We shall assume
that the economy is insurable, i.e., that for any portfolio allocation there exists another 
allocation that has the same factor representation and no idiosyncratic risk (see Connor 
( 1984)). The condition of insurahility can be equivalently stated in the following way: Let 
lvl C L00 be the linear manifold of payoffs of all portfolios of securities { r,,} ;;'=1. Let F be
the finite dimensional subspace of L00 spanned by the fact.ors .f1, . • •  , fN· The economy
i s  insurable if F C l'.1 and the payoff of the outstanding portfolio I:;:"=1 Xnrn belongs to
F. It i s  easy to see (by the argument of the second order stochastic dominance) that an 
equilibrium allocation of an insurable securities market economy has no idiosyncratic risk, 
i.e. , the payoff of each individual portfolio belongs to F (see Connor (1984), Theorem 2). 
The same holds for each Pareto optimal portfolio allocation. Consequently the utility set 
of such an economy is the same as the utility set of a finite economy with N securities 
with payoffs fi, . . .  , fN· This last economy has a dosed utility set (see Nielsen ( 1989)).
Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1: There are two cases. First. the trivial case where the initial 
allocation (e1, ... , em) i s  weakly Pareto optimal. Let G = 2:';'�1IT;(ei) - e where Ili(x) = 
{x' E Xi: ui(x') > u;(x)} for x EX;. Clearly G is convex and has non-empty interior by 
assumptions A3, and A5. \\leak Pareto optimality of the allocation ( e1, ... , em) implies 
that 0 tj. 0. Hence by the standard separation theorem, there exists a price system
p E E', p cl 0 such that py :::'.: 0 for every y E G. Since each utility function Ui is locally 
non-satiated, it follows by a . standard argument that p supports ei for every 1: = 1, ... , m.
Consequently, p i s  quasiequilibrium price system. 
For the case where (e1 , . . .  , em) is not weakly Pareto optimal, we shall follow the
Negishi's approach to existence of equilibria. This argument. requires a series of lemma.ta.  
For convenience, we shall assume throughout the proof that u;(e;) = 0 for every i. 
Lemma 1: The u lilily sel U satisfies the follrming ptopcrly: there is some r > 0 s1lch 
that 0 ::0: z E R"' and ll zll ::; 1· im.ply z E U.
Proof of Lernn1a 1: Since ( e1, . . . , e,,, ) is not weakly Pareto optimal, there is  an at­
tainable allocation :r EA such that u;(.1•;) > u.;(c;) = 0. We set r = min{ui(xi): i
1, ... ,m}. II 
Let U = {u E R"': ui::; ui(.xi). i = 1, . . . . m. for some :r E A}, then U = UnR"j:. By
assumption (Al), U i s  compact. Let oU = bd(r n R"j:, where bd[f denotes the boundary 
of the set () in R"'.
Len1111a 2: oU is homeornorphic to the simple:r 6 of Fen.
Proof of Lemma 2: The homeomorphism cb : 6 _, 5U is given by ¢( s) = p( s )s, where 
s E 6 and p(s) = sup{n > 0 : ns E U}. A proof that ¢is a homeomorphism can be 
found in l\foore (1975). Lemma. 1 guarantees that the maps are well defined. II 
For each s E 6, let x:·' EA be an attainable allocation such that ui(x1) 2 </>i(s), for 
ea.chi. Alloca.tion X8 i s  weakly Pareto optinrnl. 
Len11na 3: There e;tists an open, symmetric neighborhood \/ of 0 i:n E such tha t for 
every s E 6 there e:risls an allainob!c ollocalion ,,. EA .sud1 that u;(:r; + zi) > ¢i(s) for
every Zi E Vi + \I, and every i .  
Proof of Lemma 3: By assumptions J\2, and A5, for every s E 6 there exists v;s - an
open symmetric neighborhood ofO such that u1(.Tj+z;) > u;(xi)+ci for every Zi E vi+v;s, 
for somec:f > 0 (e.g.,c:f = �(u;(:rf+v;)-u;(:ri)). Since u;(:ri) :::'.: </>i(s) and¢ is continuous, 
there is an open neighborhood Us of s in 6 such th 11t u;(x:f + z;) >¢;(I) holds for every 
t E Us, every i,  and every z; Ev; + 1';'. The family {U,},Ec, is an open covering of 6 
which i s  compact . Therefore there exists a. finite snbcovering Us1, Us,, ... , U,k. We have 
that for every s E 6 there exists s; for 1::; j::; k snch that u;(:r? + zi) > </>i(s) holds for 
every Z; E Vi + \1,8', for every i. T1�king v = n'.'�1 n�'=I 1/' we conclude the proof. I 
Let v = Er;,1v;. We define a price set P = {p E E': pv = 1 and lpwl � 1 for w E V}. 
By Alaoglu's Theorem, the set P is com pa.ct in the weak* topology (denoted by w*) of 
E'. Following Moore (197.S), we define for each s E 6, 
P(s) ={pEP: for every allocation :r,if tL; (xi)2':¢;(s),i=l, . . . , m, 
then pz 2': 0 for -� = E�1 a:; - e }. 
Lern1na 4: P(s) is non-empty and convea· for s E 6.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let rI; = {x E X; : u;( .T) > ,P;(s)}, and G = Er;,1rI; - e. It
follows from Lemma 3 that there is an allocation .1: E A such that u; (:u; + z;) > ¢;( s) 
for every Zi E Vi+ \I. Si11ce :E�1(xi + Zi) � e = �;7�1zi, \Ye l1ave ��1zi E G for every
z; E v; + V. Consequently v + \I  C G, and G has a non-ernpty interior. \"l./e claim that
0 r/. G. Indeed, 0 E G contradicts ¢(.s) E SU. By a separation theorem, there is p # 0
which separates G from 0. Clearly JE 2': 0 for every z as in the definition of P(s). It
remains to show that p can be normalized so that p E P. This is done in the following 
way: 'We have shown that v E G an cl v + V C G. Therefore pv 2': 0 and p( v + w) 2': 0 for
w EV. \"l./e claim that pv > 0. Otherwise po= 0 and 0 � p(v ± w ) = ±pw, since w EV
implies v ± w E v + 11. Consequently, pw = 0 for every w E V which implies p = 0, a
contradiction. \Ve normalize p so that pv = 1. Tben, we also have -1 � pw � 1, i.e.,
lpwl � 1. The price system p normillizcd in the above manner belongs to P, and also to 
P(s). II 
Lemma 5: For eve1·y p E P(.s), and eury i. (/' :i:; E )(;. and u;(:r;) > ,P;(s), then
px; 2': pxf. In partic1dar, p .su.ppor·/s r'. 
Proofof Len1ma5: Let forson1ei, :t; EX; and 11.;(:i•;) 2': q\;(s). Consider a.n allocationx
defined by :r.i = "'.i for j # i and a·;= :t;. For every j, u;(:r;) 2': ¢;(s). Let z = Ej;;,1xj-e.
\Ve have pz 2': 0 for p E P(s). Howcrnr. z = .1·; - .rJ and therefore p.T, 2': 7n:f.
Define the following correspondence: 
<!.>(s)={(y1 , . . . , ym)ER"' :y;=p(e;-:r:l for every i, for some pEP(s)}
Len1ma 6: 
(i) The range of <P is bounded. 
(ii) <P has closed graph, and is conve1· valued. 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
(i) Suppose not, then there are sequences {y"} C Rm, {.sn} C 6, and {p,,} C E' such
th t II nl l + 1 n ( '" ) \\I ] _ '\'Yn ,Sn . [ )'m n _ Q a y -t co anc !/.; = Pn e; - :c;· . . e 1(1.\'C Pn e - --'i=1 Pn:T.. ·i d.11( �i=1 Yi - .
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But Pne is bounded because Pn E P ,  and P is w*-compact. l\foreover, Pnxi" is uniformly 
bounded above. Indeed, let ;ri E X; be such that u;(cr ; )  = max {u; : u E U} .  Since Pn 
supports xi" , we have ]JnXf" :S JJni: ; ,  for every n. However, PnXi is bounded above by the
same argument as above. Therefore PnJ:f" i s  uni formly bounded above and below which · 
contradicts IY� I -> +::io for some i0 .  I-IC'nce 11 E <D ( s )  i rnplies IYi l :S 5 for some 5 > 0 and
every i and s E �-
(ii) Let y = lim11n , s  = limsn, and y" E <D(sn) .  \�1e shall prove that 11 E <D(s). Since P
is w*-compact, we may assume that there is p E P such that Pn -> p in w*-topology. By
assumption A2, 1i; ( xf +Ev;) > u; ( x:J :;: c/>; ( s)  for 0 < E :S 1. Since cf> is conti nuous, we have
u;(xJ + Ev;) > c/>; (sn ) for n large enough. Applying Lemma 5, we obtain Pn(xJ-+ Ev;) :;:
]Jn Xi" = Pnei - yf. Passing to the limit, we see that pa;J + Epv; :;: pe; - y; for every
0 < £ � 1. Tl1is i111plies, p:cf 2:: }Jei - y; . S i nce "£?�'1!/i = 0 and "£�1 :1:f = I:i�1 ei, vve obta.in
Yi = p(e; - xi) .
It remains to show that p E P(s ) .  Lei :r he an allocation such tha.t n;(J:;) :;: cf>;(s)
for every i ,  a.11cl let z = Ei�1 :ri - e. D:y assurnpt i on 1\:21 ui( :i:i + Evi) > Ui(xi) for every
0 < E :S 1. By continuity of ¢, we obtain u;( :r ;  + Ev;) > ¢; (sn )  for la.rge n, and every i .
Since Pn E P(sn) ,  we have Jin:Z + S]JnV :;: 0 .  Passing t o  the limit, pz + E]JV :;: 0 for every
E .  Therefore pz :;: 0 and p E P(.s ) .  Ill 
The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 is a standard applica.tion of .Kakutani's fixed point 
theorem to show that 0 E <D(.s)  for some .'i E �- The details of the argument can be
adopted from the proof of Theorem :3. :) . 1 2  in Aliprantis. Brown, and Burkinshaw (1989) .  
The only point which requires clarification i s  LIH' proof tha.t i f  s ;  = 0 for some s E 6, 
then pe; - pxf :;: 0, for p E P ( s ) .  In our case, ii' s ;  = 0 then ¢; ( s )  = 0 = u;(e; ) .  The
i nequality pe; - p:ri :;: 0 follows therefore J'rom Lemma 5. 
Clearly if 0 E <D (s) then the attainable allocation :i:' is a quasiequilibrium with some
price p E P(s). II 
Recession (asymptotic) cone of a set. 
Let C be a closed and convex subset of F. The recession cone of C is AC = { i: E E : 
1: + ,\i: E C for every :r E C  and ,\ 2 O } .  The J'ollowi n g  is trne:
1. AC = { ;r E E :  r + C c  C } .
2. A C  = { .r E E : 1: + .\i: E C' for every .\ :;: 0 }  for arbitrary :r E C,
3. AC = n.1>o ,\ ( C - { ;r } )  for 1: E C. and Uierdore AC: is closed.
Le1nn1a: For a closed and couve;r set C. AC = p E E : .r = lin1,\n:Cn for some sequences
{ Xn }  C C and { .\ n}  C R+ with .\n -> 0 } .
1 6
Proof Let x E AC. Clearly er + nx E C  for every n and .?' = lim� (:r + nx) .  Conversely, 
let x = limAn.1'n for some {crn} C C and ,\n --+ 0 .  For n la..rge enough, An < 1 and, by
convexity of C,  AnX:n + ( 1  - An ) .T E C for every :t E C .  By closedness, taking limits as
n --+  oo ,  we obtain ;1: + J: E C, i .e . , '" E AC. I 
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